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Abstract—Privacy-preserving applications allow users to per-
form on-line daily actions without leaking sensitive information.
The privacy-preserving scalar product is one of the critical algo-
rithms in many private applications. The state-of-the-art privacy-
preserving scalar product schemes use either computationally
intensive homomorphic (public-key) encryption techniques such
as Paillier encryption to achieve strong security (i.e., 128−bit) or
random masking technique to achieve high efficiency for low
security. In this paper, lattice structures have been exploited
to develop an efficient privacy-preserving system. The proposed
scheme is not only efficient in computation as compared to the
state-of-the-art but also provides high degree of security against
quantum attacks. Rigorous security and privacy analyses of the
proposed scheme have been provided along with a concrete
set of parameters to achieve 128−bit and 256 − bit security.
Performance analysis shows that the scheme is at least five orders
faster than the Paillier schemes and at least twice as faster than
the existing randomisation technique at 128−bit security. Also
the proposed scheme requires six-time fewer data compared to
Paillier and randomisation based schemes for communications.
Index Terms—Lattice-based cryptography, privacy-preserving
techniques, scalar product computation.
I. INTRODUCTION
REGULATORS around the world are enforcing privacy-by-design and privacy-by-default approaches to protect
the users’ data in rest, transit and processing. Several service
providers and applications that traditionally use users’ data
in plain domain to extract patterns and provide services are
now applying encrypted domain computations. Some of the
example applications are disease classification in health-care,
data search in the cloud, biometric verification, etc. (e.g., [1]–
[8] and references their-in). The common theme across these
applications is that there are two distrusting parties want to
work on a common goal by combining both of their data while
preserving the data privacy. For example, a buyer wants to
verify his age to an on-line shop using security token instead
of sending date of birth.
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There are algorithms developed in literature to support data
privacy for applications such as classification algorithms, data
mining algorithms, distance calculations etc. [1]–[8]. In all
of these algorithms, one party encrypts the sensitive data
whenever that data should be sent to other party. Hence the
second party needs to process the received data in an encrypted
domain. This approach ensures data privacy. Regardless of
algorithms, privacy-preserving scalar product (PPSP) has been
used as one of the privacy enabling tools between the two par-
ties. The intuition behind this is that a mathematical function
that relies on two different variables can be modified into a
scalar product [3], [4]. Therefore, PPSP becomes a vital tool
in most of the privacy-preserving (PP) algorithms.
Suppose, there are two parties, A and B, want to compute
the following scalar product
aTb =
n∑
i=1
ai.bi,
where vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) belongs to A and vector
b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) belongs to B. The privacy requirement
here is that no party is allowed to learn the others input vector.
At the end, only one party can learn the output of the scalar
product (SP).
Several solutions have been proposed to address this prob-
lem in literature (see Section II). These solutions rely on either
public-key encryption techniques to achieve strong security or
randomisation techniques for high efficiency. The security of
these schemes rely on mathematically hard problems and these
solutions will be obsolete in few years time due to the rise of
quantum computers as there are existing quantum algorithms
which can easily solve the mathematically intractable prob-
lems [9]–[13].
Hence, this paper exploits lattice-based cryptography to
build a PPSP. The proposed model is similar to lattice-
based fully homomorphic encryption scheme [9] and support
multiple encryption and addition without decryption [11].
However, the major challenge was to ensure the error terms
are not overflowed to effect the accuracy. The paper proposes
a methodology to control the error terms while ensuring the
given security level, i.e., 128-bit.
Lattice-based cryptography has been proven to be secure
against quantum attacks and expected to replace the exist-
ing public-key cryptography schemes [9]–[13]. Therefore the
proposed solution will be secure against quantum computers
and can be used in PP algorithms for various applications to
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achieve privacy. At the same time, the experimental results
(see Section VI) show that the proposed PPSP can also be
executed significantly faster than the existing PPSP schemes
at equivalent security level.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: The related
work is discussed in Section II. The background information
about lattice-based cryptography and its hardness assumptions
are provided in Section III. The proposed algorithm is de-
scribed in Section IV followed by the security analysis and
parameter selections in Section V. Experimental results are
provided in Section VI. The conclusions and future work are
discussed in Section VII.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing PPSP schemes can broadly be divided into
two: 1) the schemes that are built using proven cryptography
such as homomorphic encryption, and 2) the schemes that are
built based on information theory such as randomisation and
linear algebra. Even though the latter is much efficient than
former, security level of latter is not quantified. The following
subsections study the state-of-the-art algorithms for each of
these schemes.
A. Homomorphic encryption based PPSP
Homomorphic encryption techniques such as Paillier play a
vital role in supporting PPSP since it offers high security such
as 128−bits [21]. Even though this scheme is highly secure,
it becomes inefficient with the size of the vectors i.e., it may
take long time (i.e., a few minutes in modern laptops with
five cores and 6GB memory) to compute the scalar product
when the dimension of the vectors is around 1000. Several
efficient PPSP schemes were proposed in literature to improve
the efficiency [20], [22], [24]–[30]. All these schemes use the
homomorphic PPSP scheme as a benchmark to measure the
efficiency. We discuss these in the following subsections.
A lattice based functional encryption technique that predi-
cates whether the SP is equivalent to 0 or not 0 was proposed
in [18]. This work is based on lattice trapdoors [16]. If the
SP is equivalent to 0 then the trapdoors successfully remove
large elements in the problem. Note that the work in [18] is
completely different to the objective of the proposed work on
this paper and the algorithm in [18] cannot be modified to
develop a PPSP scheme.
There are works that directly uses Learning with errors
based cryptographic scheme for encrypted domain matrix
calculations [34]–[37]. These works treat the encryption tech-
nique as a black-box to develop several applications ranging
from logistic regression based prediction to statistics of smart
meter reading in encrypted domain. In contrast to traditional
homomorphic encryption such as Paillier, the learning with
error based encryption involve a number of parameters that
must be set properly for problems with different dimensions.
Otherwise, as we will show in Section III, error terms will
overflow and decryption will be unsuccessful. In this paper, we
clearly show how to setup the parameters to achieve different
level of security. Most importantly this is the first paper
that compares the performance of quantum secure crypto-
graphic scheme against traditional homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme and information theoretic secure scheme and
show that a quantum cryptographic based scheme can
outperform the other schemes if the parameters are set
properly.
B. Information theory based PPSP
In 2001, Du et al proposed a PPSP algorithm using 1-out-
of-N oblivious transfer function and homomorphic encryption
[24]. This algorithm is based on splitting the input vector a of
Party A into p number of random vectors to achieve privacy
from Party B. The drawback of this method is that both parties
need to be on-line and interact several times to perform the
SP.
In 2002, Du et al proposed another SP which reduces the
communication complexity of their previous work [24] but
with the help of a third-party semi-trusted server [25]. The
algorithm in [25] requires a third-party sever to generate two
random vectors RA and RB . The vector RA will be revealed
to A and the vector RB will be revealed to B. Using these
vectors, A and B compute the shares of the SP. Hence, both
the parties must reveal their shares to get the actual SP value.
The communication complexity of this protocol is four times
higher than the communication cost of SP without privacy.
Moreover, the major draw back of this work is the involvement
of third-party who can easily collude with one of the parties
to reveal the other party’s input vector.
Vaidya and Clifton in 2002 proposed a novel PPSP solution
but without the need of third-party in [26]. The communication
complexity of the algorithm in [26] is same as [25]. However,
the computation cost is O(n2) while it is O(n) for the [25].
Moreover, the security of the SP algorithm in [26] depends on
the difficulty of solving n/2 linear equations.
In 2007, Amirbekyan et. al. proposed a homomorphic
encryption and randomisation (or add vector protocol) based
PPSP [27]. Since 2aT .b =
∑n
i=1 a
2
i +
∑n
i=1 b
2
i −(a−b)2, the
authors of [27] exploited homomorphic encryption technique
to compute a − b. Party A generates public and private
key pairs using any homomorphic encryption scheme that
offers additive homomorphism (i.e., Pailler encryption) and
encrypt the elements of vector a. The encrypted vector and
the public key are sent to Party B. Party B subtract its vector
b from encrypted a using homomorphic properties and obtain
encrypted (a−b). Subsequently, Party B permutes and sends
the elements of encrypted (a−b) to Party A. Party A decrypts
the vector received from Party B and obtains the permuted
(a − b). Party A also receives ∑ni=1 b2i from Party B. Using
these, Party A can compute the required SP. Similarly, there
are several variations of PPSP algorithms proposed in literature
they either use homomorphic encryption or randomisation or
both [28]–[30].
One of the algorithms that is secure and lightweight to-
date is called Secure and Privacy-preserving Opportunistic
Computing proposed in [20] which is proven to be faster than
all the other SP and achieve high security. In [20], the security
and privacy of the input vectors are protected by masking
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them by large random integers whose size is around 512
bits. It is shown in [20], that the computational complexity
is almost negligible and communication complexity is almost
half compared to the Paillier homomorphic encryption based
SP [21]. To make a fair comparison with the proposed scheme,
we reset the parameters to achieve 128−bit security against
traditional computers. Then in Section VI, we compare the
performance of [20] against the proposed lattice-based PPSP
scheme and show that the latter one is, at least twice as fast
as the [20] algorithm.
Recently, linear algebra based PPSP was proposed in [22]
for biometric identification. The solution proposed is efficient
and do not require parties to be on-line. In particular, the
solution is very useful when Party A wants to outsource the
SP computation to Party B.
For this scheme, Party A holds both the input vectors a and
b. Initially, Party A obtains a diagonal matrix A using the
input vector a followed by generating two random invertable
matrices M1 and M2 and a random lower triangular matrix
U. The encryption of the input vector a is simply a matrix
multiplication i.e., M1UAM2. This encrypted matrix is send
to Party B. Later, if Party A wants to compute a SP aTb then
Party A generates a random lower triangular matrix V and
computes M−11 VBM
−1
1 as an encryption of b where matrix
B is just a diagonal matrix of b. This encrypted matrix is sent
to Party B who computes the following which is equivalent to
aTb: Tr{M−11 VBM−12 .M1UAM2} where Tr is a matrix
trace operation [19].
This model has been applied in various biometric authen-
tication applications. For example, recently, the work in [23]
exploited this scheme to protect biometric templates. In [23],
the user extracts biometric template a and encrypts using
random matrices as explained in the previous paragraph.
Later, if the user wants to authenticate to the server, then
the user extracts a new biometric sample, lets say b, and
encrypts using the random matrices and send it to server.
Using these encrypted samples (i.e., a and b), the server
can find the similarities. This model requires multiplication of
several matrices and the complexity will increase substantially
when the elements of the matrices are set to large integers to
achieve 128−bit or higher security. Again, the security of these
schemes are dependent on integer factorisation and vulnerable
for quantum algorithms.
III. LATTICE BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY
Notations: We use bold lower-case letters like x to denote
column vectors; for row vectors we use the transpose xT .
We use bold upper-case letters like A to denote matrices,
and identify a matrix with its ordered set of column vectors.
We denote horizontal concatenation of vectors and/or matrices
using vertical bar, e.g., [A|A.x] where . denotes the matrix
multiplication. For any integer q ≥ 2, we use Zq to denote
the ring of integers modulo q, Zn×mq to denote the set of
n×m matrix with entries in Zq. We denote a real number x
as x ∈ R.
A. Lattices
An m−dimensional lattice Λ is a full-rank discrete sub-
group of Rm [12]. Let b1, b2, . . . ,bn denote the n linearly
independent vectors in Rm. Then m−dimensional lattice
Λ is defined to be the set of all integer combinations of
b1, b2, . . . ,bn as follows:
Λ =
n∑
i=1
xibi, (1)
where xi ∈ Z, ∀i. The set of vectors b1, b2, . . . ,bn is called
basis for the lattice Λ, and n is called the rank of the lattice.
Without loss of generality, we consider integer lattices i.e.,
whose points have coordinates in Zm. Among these lattices,
many cryptographic applications use a particular family of
so-called “q−ary” integer lattices which contain qZm as a
sub-lattice for some small integer q. There are two different
q−ary lattices considered in many lattice-based cryptographic
applications. Let us define them as follows:
1) Λ⊥q (A): For instance, for any integer q ≥ 2 and any
A ∈ Zn×mq , a set of vectors e ∈ Zm that satisfy the following
equation
A.e = 0 mod q (2)
forms a lattice of dimension m, which is closed under con-
gruence modulo q. This lattice is denoted by Λ⊥q (A) where
Λ⊥q (A) := {e ∈ Zm|A.e = 0 mod q}. (3)
Using Λ⊥q (A), we define a coset or shifted lattice Λ
u
q (A) where
Λuq (A) := {e ∈ Zm|A.e = u mod q},
= Λ⊥q (A) + x, (4)
where u ∈ Znq is an integer solution to
A.x = u mod q. (5)
2) Λ(AT ): Similarly, we can define another
m−dimensional q-ary lattice, Λ(AT ). For a set of vectors
e ∈ Zm, and s ∈ Znq which satisfy the following equation:
e = AT .s mod q (6)
where
Λ(AT ) := {e ∈ Zm|s ∈ Znq s.t. e = AT .s mod q}. (7)
It is easy to check that Λ⊥q (A) and Λ(A
T ) are dual lattices.
B. Lattice Hard Problems
There are three well-known hard problems in lattice that
have been exploited by researchers to build several crypto-
graphic applications. This section defines these hard problems
briefly.
1) Short integer solution: Hardness of finding a short
integer solution (SIS) was first exploited by Ajtai [10]. The SIS
has served as a foundation for many cryptographic applications
such as one-way hash function, identification scheme and
digital signature using lattices. The SIS can be defined as
follows:
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Definition for SIS: For a given m uniformly random
vectors ai ∈ Znq , forming columns of a matrix A ∈
Z
n×m
q , finding a non-zero short integer vector z ∈ Zm
with norm ||z|| < β such that
Az =
m∑
i=1
ai.zi = 0 mod q
is intractable.
This problem has the following useful observations:
1) Without the requirement of ||z|| < β i.e., “short” solution,
it is easy to find a vector z via Gaussian elimination that
satisfies Az = 0 mod q.
2) The problem becomes easier to solve if m is increased
and difficult to solve if n is increased.
3) The norm bound β and the number m of the column
vectors must be large enough that a solution is guaranteed
to exist. This is the case when β >
√
n.log(q).
2) Inhomogeneous short integer solution: Inhomogeneous
short integer solution (ISIS) is a variant of SIS. ISIS problem
can be defined as follows [11], [12]:
Definition for ISIS: For a given m uniformly random
vectors ai ∈ Znq , forming columns of a matrix A ∈
Z
n×m
q , and a uniform random vector u ∈ Znq , finding
a non-zero integer vector z ∈ Zm with norm ||z|| < β
such that
Az =
m∑
i=1
ai.zi = u mod q
is intractable.
3) Learning with errors: Learning with errors (LWE) [9],
[13] is an encryption-enabling lattice-based problem but sim-
ilar to SIS. To enable encryption, the LWE problem depends
on a “small” error distribution over integers. The LWE is
parametrised by positive integers n and q, and a small error
distribution X ∈ Zq , which is typically be a “rounded”
normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation αq2pi .
The constant α plays a critical role in the security of LWE
and it should be chosen as large as possible while satisfying
the following condition [9]:
αq > 2
√
n. (8)
There are two versions of LWE based problems. Before defin-
ing these, let us define a distribution called LWE-distribution
as follows:
LWE Distribution: For a given secret vector s ∈ Znq ,
a sample from LWE distribution As,X ∈ Znq × Zq is
obtained by choosing a vector a ∈ Znq uniformly at
random, a “small” error e ∈ X , and outputting (a, b =
sTa+ e mod q).
Using the LWE distribution, we can define two versions of
LWE problem as follows:
1. Search-LWE: Given m independent samples
(ai, bi) ∈ Znq × Zq drawn from the above LWE
distribution As,X for a uniformly random s ∈ Znq
(fixed for all samples), it is intractable to find s.
2. Decision-LWE: Given m independent samples
(ai, bi) ∈ Znq × Zq where every sample is distributed
according to either: (1) As,X for a uniformly random
s ∈ Znq (fixed for all samples), or (2) the uniform
distribution, then distinguishing which is the case is
intractable.
We can have the following observations from the two LWE
problems outlined above:
1) Without the error term e ∈ X , the search-LWE problem
can be solved easily using Gaussian elimination technique
and the secret s can be recovered.
2) Similarly for decision-LWE problem, without the error
term e ∈ X , Gaussian elimination technique will reveal
with high probability that no solution s exists if it is not
sampled from LWE distribution.
3) If there are m LWE samples (ai, bi) ← As,X for a
uniformly random s ∈ Znq (fixed for all samples), we can
combine all ais into a matrix A = [a1, a2, . . . , am] ∈
Z
n×m
q , bis into a vector b = [b1, b2, . . . , bm]
T , and eis
into a vector e = [e1, e2, . . . , em]
T into the following
vector-matrix linear equation
bT = sTA+ eT (mod q).
In the following sections, we will exploit the above lattice hard
problems to develop the the lattice-based PPSP.
IV. LATTICE-BASED PP SCALAR PRODUCT COMPUTATION
Let us suppose, there are two distrusting entities, X and Y.
Entity X owns an m−dimensional binary vector x ∈ {0, 1}m.
Entity Y owns another m−dimensional binary vector y ∈
{0, 1}m. Both X and Y want to interact with each other to
compute the SP s = xTy without revealing their own vector
to the other party. In the end, one-party obtains s = xTy. To
perform PPSP using lattice, there are four steps required. The
following subsections describe each of them in details. The
complete algorithm is given in Fig. 1.
1) System initialisation: Let us start with generating a
uniformly random matrix A ∈ Zn×mq which is known to X
and Y. The matrix A contains column vectors a1, a2, . . ., am
∈ Znq i.e., A = [a1, a2, . . . , am].
2) Step 1: Entity X computes a SIS style vector using A
and the binary vector x as
u = Ax (mod q) ∈ Znq , (9)
and sends u to Y.
3) Step 2: Entity Y generates a uniformly random vector
t ∈ Znq , a small error term e1 ← X , and a small error vector
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System Initilisation
Public Parameters
A ∈ Zn×mq
Entity X Entity Y
Inputs:
x ∈ {0, 1}m
Inputs:
y ∈ {0, 1}m
t ∈ Znq ,
e1 ← X ,
e2 ← Xm.
Step 1:
u = Ax ∈ Znq Step 2:
c1 = t
Tu +
e1 ∈ Zq,
cT2 = t
TA+ eT2 +
⌊ q
m
⌉yT ∈ Z1×mqStep 3:
s =
⌊
c
T
2
x−c1
⌊ q
m
⌉
⌉
START
u
c1, c2
END
Fig. 1. Flow diagram for the proposed lattice-based privacy-preserving scalar
product computation for binary vectors
e2 = [e2,1, e2,2, . . . , e2,m]
T ← Xm. Then Y computes the
following LWE style term c1 and vector c2:
c1 = t
Tu+ e1 (mod q) ∈ Zq, (10)
cT2 = t
TA+ eT2 + ⌊
q
m
⌉yT (mod q) ∈ Z1×mq , (11)
and sends these to X.
4) Step 3: Entity X performs the following computation to
retrieve the SP value s = xTy as follows:
s =
⌊
cT2 x− c1
⌊ q
m
⌉
⌉
. (12)
A. Condition for Correctness
Let us derive the condition for the above-mentioned algo-
rithm to output a correct result. In (12),
cT2 x− c1 = (tTA+ eT2 + ⌊
q
m
⌉yT )x− (tTu+ e1),
= tTAx+ eT2 x+ ⌊
q
m
⌉yTx− tTu− e1.
Since Ax = u, and tTAx = tTu,
cT2 x− c1 = ⌊
q
m
⌉yTx+ eT2 x− e1. (13)
In (13), the scalar product is masked by error term eT2 x− e1.
To output a correct answer, this error term must satisfy the
following condition:
eT2 x− e1 < ⌊
q
2m
⌉, (14)
hence,
eT2 x− e1
⌊ q
m
⌉ <
1
2
. (15)
Therefore,
s =
⌊
cT2 x− c1
⌊ q
m
⌉
⌉
=
⌊⌊ q
m
⌉yTx+ eT2 x− e1
⌊ q
m
⌉
⌉
= yTx,
which proves the correctness of the proposed algorithm.
Further, the requirements for the error term (14) should be
analysed and defined such that eT2 x − e1 is always smaller
than ⌊ q2m⌉. To achieve this, we need to find the upper bound
for the error term. The following subsection is dedicated for
this analysis.
B. Upper bound of the error term (eT2 x− e1)
As we described in Section III-B3, the small error terms are
sampled from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard
deviation α√
2pi
(let us denote this as Ψ0, α√
2pi
) followed by
scaling and modulo reduction by q as follows:
e = ⌊wq⌉(mod q) (16)
where w ← Ψ0, α√
2pi
and e belongs to a “rounded” normal
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation αq√
2pi
(let us
denote this as X0, αq√
2pi
).
Let us also denote vectors w = [w1, w2, . . . , wm] ←
Ψm0, α√
2pi
and w¯ = [w1, w2, . . . , wm+1] ← Ψm+10, α√
2pi
. Hence the
error vector
e = ⌊wq⌉(mod q). (17)
Using the above information, let us find the upper bound for
the error term eT2 x− e1. Let us define an m+ 1 dimensional
vector e¯ = [eT2 e1]
T and another m + 1 dimensional vector
x¯ = [xT − 1]T , hence, eT2 x− e1 = e¯T x¯. Using the triangle
inequality, we can define the upper bound of the error term as
follows:
|eT2 x− e1| = |e¯T x¯| ≤ |(e¯− qw¯)T x¯|+ |(qw¯)T x¯|. (18)
Using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality [19], we can define the
upper bound for the terms in (18) as follows:
|(e¯− qw¯)T x¯| < ||e¯− qw¯||.||x¯|| (19)
|(qw¯)T x¯| < ||qw¯||.||x¯|| (20)
According to (16) and (17), the rounding error for the com-
ponents w is at most 12 (i.e., e − ⌊wq⌉ ≤ 12 ), we have
||e¯− qw¯|| ≤
√
m+1
2 and ||e1 − qw|| ≤
√
m
2 . Hence,
||e¯− qw¯||.||x¯||+ ||qw¯||.||x¯|| ≤
√
m+ 1
2
||x¯||+ ||qw||.||x¯||.
Since x¯ ∈ {0, 1}m+1, the Euclidean norm of x¯ is ||x¯|| ≤√
m+ 1. Hence,
√
m+ 1
2
||x¯||+ ||qw||.||x¯|| ≤ m+ 1
2
+ ||qw||.√m+ 1.
Since w← Ψm+10, α√
2pi
and qw ← Xm+10, qα√
2pi
, if we choose standard
deviation as 4.5, then the probability
Pr
(
|qw| > 4.5× qα√
2pi
)
< 2.5× 10−7,
(i.e., one in four million). The probability will decrease further
if we choose a higher number of standard deviations for the
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upper bound. Without loss of generality, in the rest of the
paper, we consider standard deviation as 4.5. Therefore, with
very high probability,
||qw¯|| ≤ 4.5qα
√
m+ 1
2pi
. (21)
Therefore, with very high probability, the error
|eT2 x− e1| ≤
m+ 1
2
+ ||qw||.√m+ 1,
≤ m+ 1
2
+ 4.5qα
√
m+ 1
2pi
.
√
m+ 1.
As long as this error is smaller than ⌊ q2m⌉, i.e.,
m+ 1
2
+ 4.5qα
(m+ 1)√
2pi
≤
⌊ q
2m
⌉
, (22)
our proposed solution outputs a correct result. Hence, if the
upper bound for α is
α ≤
√
2pi
4.5q(m+ 1)
[
⌊ q
2m
⌉ − m+ 1
2
]
, (23)
then with high probability (it may not provide correct result
one in four million times), the proposed algorithm outputs a
correct result. This concludes the proof for correctness. The
requirements for the correctness are listed in Table I.
Extending the inputs from {0,1} to integer inputs {0,1,2, .
l} will lead to a smaller bin size i.e., q/(m ∗ l2). Using this
smaller size, the equations (14) to (23) can be revised to obtain
parameters for input {0,1,2, . l}. The next section analyses
the security of the proposed algorithm.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
As defined in Section IV (refer to Fig. 1), the objective is
to protect the privacy of x from Y and y from X. Entities X
and Y interact with each other to compute the SP.
Firstly, let us prove that Y cannot learn the secret vector x
from the exchanged vector u in Step 1. Since x ∈ {0, 1}m
(therefore x is a short vector), according to the hardness of
ISIS problem defined in Section III-B, it is intractable for Y to
solve u = Ax mod q and obtain a short vector as a solution.
Step 1 operation is similar to hashing. Since the dimension
of typical vector x is 10000, there are 210000 possibilities.
The only problem is (as same as in any hashing algorithm)
the output of Step 1 is deterministic for same x.
Therefore brute force approach may not work for Y. Hence
Y needs to use mathematical properties to solve the problem
to uncover x from u. In other words, if Y can recover x from
u then Y can solve the lattice hardest problem. As defined
in Section III-B, Y cannot find a vector x shorter than β i.e.,
||x|| < β. Therefore, let us analyse the shortest possible vector
which can be recovered by Y.
Suppose if Y wants to find a short vector x from u =
Ax mod q then Y may exploit the state-of-the-art techniques
called lattice reduction method [14] and/or combinatorial
method [15]. Denote the shortest vector which can be found by
these techniques as xs. It is proven in literature (theoretically
and experimentally) [17], that the Euclidean length of xs has
a lower-bound as follows:
||xs|| ≥ min
{
q, 22
√
n.log(q)log(δ)
}
, (24)
where δ ≥ 1.01 [14]. Since the X’s secret vector x ∈ {0, 1}m,
the Euclidean length ||x|| ≤ √m. Hence, using (24) and
assuming q is very large, if
√
m < 22
√
n.log(q)log(δ), (25)
then Y cannot recover x from u. This is a first condition for
security. This concludes that if condition (25) is met then Y
cannot recover x from u. Also, the cost (L) of finding a short
binary vector using the techniques described above is defined
as [17]:
L ≈ 2 m2k , (26)
where k should satisfy the following equation:
2k
k + 1
≈ m
n.log(q)
. (27)
Now let us focus whether X can recover y from the messages
c1 and c2 sent by Y to X in Step 2.
According to the definition in Section III-B, if c1 and c2 are
LWE terms then it is intractable for X to recover y since c1 and
c2 are indistinguishable from uniformly random distribution.
If t, u, and A are uniformly distributed and the error term e1
and error vector e2 are sampled from normal distribution with
standard deviation greater than 2
√
n as defined in (8) then c1
and c2 are uniformly random.
Matrix A is already a uniformly random matrix. Entity
Y can generate uniformly random t, e1 and e2. The vector
u sent by X is uniformly random as long as the number
of possibilities for x is larger than u i.e., 2m > qn or
m > n.log(q) [17] (this is the second security condition).
Since the dimension of t is m > 1, and the scalar
tTu is masked by an error term e1, the term c1 is scalar
and completely random. Therefore, according to the LWE
definition, it is intractable for X to recover the elements of
t from scalar c1. To analyse c2, let us denote the ith element
of c2 as c2,i where c2,i = t
Tai + e2,1 + ⌊ q2m⌉yi. In c2,i,
tTai + e2,1 is scalar and LWE term i.e., uniformly random.
Similar to LWE encryption scheme [9], tTai + e2,1 acts like
a one-time pad to hide the message ⌊ q2m⌉yi. Hence, X cannot
recover yi from c2,i and therefore the proposed scheme is
secure. In Section V-A, we show that our parameter choice
satisfying (8) (third security condition) is hard and at least
equivalent to 128−bit security.
In LWE, the noise term plays a major role in determining
the hardness [9]. The normal distribution where the error terms
are sampled must satisfy (8). The α term must be chosen as
largest possible while satisfying (8) for hardness of LWE. To
quantify the hardness or security level of LWE for a concrete
set of parameters, Regev et. al exploited the dual lattice in [17,
p. 21]. The idea is to find how many operations are required
to distinguish an LWE term from uniform distribution. This
is only possible if an adversary can find a short vector on
dual lattice. To this, let us denote a vector v and denote a
short vector in dual lattice as w. If the vector v is an LWE
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TABLE I
REQUIREMENTS FOR PARAMETERS TO ACHIEVE 128-BIT SECURITY AND CORRECTNESS WHEN THE STANDARD DEVIATION IS SET FOR 4.5.
n m
Correctness n ≥ 1 m ≥ 1
Security n.log(q) > 128 m ≥ nlog(q) & √m < 22
√
nlog(q)log(δ)
α q
Correctness α ≤
√
2pi
4.5q(m+1)
[⌊ q2m⌉ − m+12 ] q > 2m
Security α ≥ max
{
2
√
n
q
, 1.5
√
2pi.max
{
1/q, 2−2
√
n.log(q).log(δ)
}}
q > n
vector then the scalar product vTw will be an integer [17,
p. 22]. If not then v is a uniform random vector. Therefore
finding a short vector in dual lattice must be hard. If the
standard deviation of the error term αq/2pi is not bigger than
1/||w|| then it may be possible to find a short vector in dual
lattice. Therefore, error term must be bigger than 1/||w|| for
LWE security. This requirement and (24) can now be used to
quantify the LWE security.
Now using the lattice properties i.e., the length of a shorter
vector in dual lattice is equivalent to 1/q times the length of
shorter vector in lattice [17, p. 22]. Using this and (24), we can
say ||w|| ≈ 1
q
.min
{
q, 22
√
n.log(q)log(δ)
}
. Therefore if error
αq√
2pi
>>
1
||w|| , (28)
then LWE is hard. By taking 1.5 as factor, we can define the
lower-bound for α from (28) as follows [17]:
α ≥ 1.5
√
2pi.max
{
1/q, 2−2
√
n.log(q).log(δ)
}
. (29)
The cost of finding a shorter vector is same as (26). In Section
V-A, we show that our parameter choice to satisfy (8) is hard
and at least equivalent to 128−bit security.
A. Parameter Selection
Firstly, let us obtain the relationship between q andm. Since
the maximum possible value for xTy is m, we split q into
m parts i.e., the distance between the consecutive values is
⌊ q
m
⌉. To obtain a correct result, as shown in (22), half of
this distance should be larger to accommodate the error term
i.e., ⌊ q2m⌉ > 1 or q > 2m. Table I provides the necessary
requirements for all the parameters to achieve correctness and
security. This table is a summary of requirements derived
in the previous sections. Using this table, let us obtain a
concrete set of parameters to achieve 128−bit security. The
same strategy has been used to obtain the parameters for lower
security (i.e., 80−bits, and 112−bits) and higher security
256−bits in Section VI.
To obtain 128−bit security, we need to choose our parame-
ters in such a way that the cost equation (26), L ≈ 2 m2k ≥ 2128.
If we choose k = 2 then from (27), m ≈ n.log(q). Hence,
L ≈ 2n.log(q) ≥ 2128. Therefore the security of the solution
would be equal to 128−bits if n.log(q) ≈ m ≥ 128.
Based on this and other requirements (all are listed in Table
I), we are proposing six sets of parameters in Table II
to achieve 128−bits security. These parameters have been
cross validated using the well known LWE Estimator [33]
[- the source code for the LWE Estimator, that calculates
the security complexity using six different algorithms such
as lattice-reduction, dual-lattice attacks etc, is available at
https://bitbucket.org/malb/lwe-estimator].
TABLE II
CHOICES FOR THE SECURITY PARAMETERS TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST
128−BIT SECURITY.
SET n
m
≈
q
≈
Security
≈
α.q
(error std. ≈)
I 50 215 2570 2128 2538
II 100 215 2270 2128 2238
III 250 215 2116 2128 285
IV 500 215 255 2128 224
V 1000 215 239 2187 27
VI 2000 216 241 2517 27
In Table II, parameters n and q play a major role to ensure
128−bit security. They are linked as increasing n leading to
a small q. These parameters determine the size of matrix A
and the memory requirement. The first four sets are equivalent
in terms of memory (≈ 100MB) while the last two require
around 200MB and 800MB, respectively. As shown in the
experiments, running time for the last two are significantly
higher and not useful for practical applications. For Sets V
and VI, the size of q is not decreasing as much as those for the
other sets. The security levels for Sets V and VI are 187−bits
and 517−bits, respectively. The reason is that, larger n leads
to a larger m, hence, in order to satisfy the error distribution
parameter α in (23), the value for q must be set to high.
Increasing the value for α will increase the security.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to evaluate the proposed LWE based PPSP scheme,
we implemented the algorithm in Java and tested on a 64-bit
Windows PC with 16GB RAM and Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-
4210U CPU at 1.70GHz. For performance comparison, we
also implemented the Paillier homomorphic encryption based
PPSP scheme [21] on the same PC using Java. Additionally,
we compared our scheme with one of the most efficient PPSP
algorithms in [20]. Our test results show that the proposed
LWE based scheme is significantly faster (at least 105 times
faster) than the Paillier homomorphic PPSP scheme and at
least twice as fast as [20] for the 128−bit security.
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TABLE III
PAILLIER HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION BASED PPSP [21].
Input by X: a = [a1, . . . , am]
T ∈ {0, 1}m
and Y: b = [b1, . . . , bm]
T ∈ {0, 1}m
Output to X: aTb
Step 1: X performs the following operations:
Generates Paillier public-private key pairs {pub, sk},
FOR EACH ai, i = 1, 2, ..., m
Computes
Epub(ai) = JaiK,
END FOR
keeps sk, and sends (pub,Epub(a1) . . . Epub(am)) to Y
Step 2: Y executes the following operations
Using bi, i = 1, 2, ..., m+ 2
Computes
E(aTb) = Ja1K
b1 .Ja2K
b2 . . . JamK
bm
Sends E(aTb) back to X
Step 3: X decrypts and obtains
a
T
b = Dsk(E(a
T
b)).
A. Proposed Lattice-based PPSP Scheme and Paillier PPSP
scheme
The Paillier cryptosystem [21] is an additively homomor-
phic public-key encryption scheme. Its provable semantic
security is based on the decisional composite residuosity
problem: it is mathematically intractable to decide whether an
integer z is an n-residue modulo n2 for some composite n, i.e.
whether there exists some y ∈ Z∗n2 such that z = yn mod n2.
Let n = pq where p and q are two large prime numbers.
A message m ∈ Zn can be encrypted using the Paillier
cryptosystem as JmK = gmrn mod n2 where g ∈ Z∗n2 and
r ∈ Z∗n. For a given encryption Jm1K and Jm2K, an encryption
Jm1 +m2K can be obtained as Jm1 +m2K = Jm1KJm2K, and
multiplication of an encryption Jm1K with a constant α can
be computed efficiently as Jm1.αK = Jm1K
α. Hence, a Paillier
cryptosystem is an additively homomorphic cryptosystem. Let
us denoteE() andD() as the Paillier homomorphic encryption
and decryption functions. Using the homomorphic properties
and the above definitions, homomorphic encryption based
PPSP is described in Table III.
According to NIST recommendation [31], [32], public-
key encryption schemes such as RSA and Paillier must use
3072−bit long keys for encryption and decryption in order to
achieve 128−bit security. Hence, to obtain the running time
for the Paillier homomorphic encryption based PPSP, we used
3072−bit long keys. We also obtained the running time for
the proposed LWE based scheme for the first five sets of
parameter given in Table II (Sixth set was ignored as it was
taking too much time to run). The running times averaged
over 100 executions are listed in Table IV [no parallelization
or multi-threading was used].
As presented in Table IV, the result of Set I has outper-
formed the other sets. This is due to the fact that, even though
the security levels are equal across all the sets, when the size
for n increases, the matrix A becomes larger and requires an
increased number of multiplications. In turn, this slows down
the algorithm. With this observation, we will continue using
the parameters that belong to Set I for the remainder of our
TABLE IV
AVERAGE RUNNING TIME FOR THE PROPOSED AND PAILLIER-BASED
PPSP SCHEMES.
The Proposed
Lattice-based PPSP
Pailler Based
PPSP
(ms)SET
Step 1
(ms)
Step 2
(ms)
Step 3
(ms)
Total
(ms)
I 692 2482 21 3195 ≈ 5× 108
II 756 3207 9 3972 ≈ 5× 108
III 2456 7146 12 9614 ≈ 5× 108
IV 4721 16972 9 21702 ≈ 5× 108
V 129328 206741 8 336077 ≈ 8× 108
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Fig. 2. Average running time for the proposed LWE PPSP scheme against
the Paillier PPSP scheme for different security levels. Note that y-axis is in
log scale.
experiments presented in this paper. The last column in Table
IV shows the average running time for the Paillier scheme.
The proposed scheme is at least 105 times faster than Paillier
PPSP scheme. The dimensions of the input vectors for these
sets are in the range of 20000 to 50000 (see the third column
in Table II).
To compare the performance of the proposed scheme for
different security levels, a new set of parameters are provided
in Table V. Based on the NIST recommendations [31], [32],
the key sizes for the Paillier scheme is also provided in Table
V. Using this information, the average running time is plotted
in Fig 2. While the average running time for the proposed
scheme is increasing linearly, it increases exponentially for
the Paillier scheme. It should be noted that the average
running time for the proposed scheme is around 8 seconds at
256−bit security [without any parallel computations or multi-
threading]. These results demonstrate that the proposed lattice
PPSP scheme is significantly faster than the Paillier PPSP.
TABLE V
PARAMETERS AND KEY SIZES FOR THE PROPOSED AND PAILLIER BASED
PPSP SCHEMES FOR DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SECURITY.
Security n
m
≈
q
≈
α.q
≈
Paillier
Key Size
280 50 23500 2470 2439 1024
2112 50 27500 2550 2518 2048
2128 50 28500 2570 2538 3072
2192 50 40500 2810 2777 7680
2256 50 50000 21000 2997 15360
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B. Proposed Scheme and Randomisation Technique
Table VI shows the state-of-the-art randomisation based
PPSP [4], [20]. The security of this algorithm depends on
the hardness of the factoring an integer i.e., Ci = s(ai.α +
ci) mod p, ai 6= 0. Cis are protected by s and known only
to X. If Y wants to recover the X’s input vector, Y needs to
factor all Cis to find the common s. This approach can be
seen as an approach used in RSA encryption or any public-
key encryption that relies on hardness of factoring integers.
According to the NIST recommendation [31], [32], the size
of these integers must be around 3072−bit in order to obtain
128−bit security (without loss of generality, we ignore the
requirement of prime numbers). Hence, we set k1 in Table VI
to 3072−bits to compare randomisation-based PPSP and the
proposed lattice PPSP scheme.
Using this setting, the average running time for the pro-
posed and randomisation based PPSP schemes are obtained at
128−bit security. Fig. 3 shows the average running times for
both schemes for different input vectors whose dimensions
are between 30000 and 50000. The proposed scheme is at
least twice as fast compared to randomisation based scheme
for the security parameters. It should be noted that, since
randomisation-based scheme relies on hardness of integer
factorisation, similar to Paillier scheme, it is also vulnerable
for quantum attacks.
TABLE VI
RANDOMISATION BASED PP SCALAR PRODUCT ALGORITHM.
Input by X: a = [a1, . . . , am]
T ∈ {0, 1}m
and Y: b = [b1, . . . , bm]
T ∈ {0, 1}m
Output to X: aTb
Step 1: X performs the following operations:
Given security parameters k1, k2, k3, k4,
choose two large primes α, p
such that |p| = k1, |α| = k2, set am+1 = am+2 = 0
Choose a large random number s ∈ Zp, and m+ 2 random
numbers ci, i = 1, 2, ..., m+ 2, with |ci| = k3
FOR EACH ai, i = 1, 2, ..., m+ 2
Compute
Ci = s(ai.α+ ci) mod p, ai 6= 0
Ci = sci mod p, ai = 0
END FOR
keeps s−1mod p secret, and sends (α, p, C1 . . . Cm+2) to Y
Step 2: Y executes the following operations
set bm+1 = bm+2 = 0
FOR EACH bi, i = 1, 2, ..., m+ 2
Compute
Di = bi.α.Ci mod p, bi 6= 0
Di = ri.Ci mod p, bi = 0,
where ri is a random number with |ri| = k4
END FOR
Send D =
∑m+2
i=1 Di mod p to X
Step 3: Now X computes and obtains
E = s−1.D mod p and get aTb
=
∑n
i=1 ai.bi =
E−(E mod α2)
α2
.
Even though the proposed scheme is developed to protect
the PP applications against the quantum computers, the effi-
ciency analysis shows that the algorithm can be used to replace
the existing schemes. Running time in Table IV is obtained
from sequential programming. It is taking around 3 seconds to
m = 30000 m = 35000 m = 40000 m = 45000 m = 50000
Dimensions of Input Vectors
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Fig. 3. Average running time for the proposed LWE PPSP scheme against
the Randomisation-based PPSP scheme [4], [20] for different sizes of input
vectors.
execute the SP of two vectors whose dimensions are around
30000. Nearly 2.5 seconds are spent on Step 2 calculating
(11). This equation can be computed in parallel i.e., tTA is
equivalent to tTai where i ≤ m. Therefore, we used multi
threading features of Java to speed-up the process. By setting
four threads, average running time has been reduced to 1.2
seconds from 3 seconds.
C. Communication Complexity
Using the algorithms in Fig. 1 (the proposed LWE scheme),
Table III (Paillier Homomorphic Encryption Scheme based
PPSP), and Table VI (Randomisation based PPSP), we can
calculate the communication cost in terms of transmitted bits
between Entity X and Entity Y.
1) Total bits transmitted from Entity X to Entity Y: Total
number of bits required to for the proposed LWE based PPSP
scheme is n ∗ log2(q). Similarly, m ∗ log2(pub) and (m+4) ∗
log2(k1) number of bits are required for the Paillier based
scheme and Randomisation scheme, respectively.
2) Total bits transmitted from Entity Y to Entity X: Total
number of bits required to for the proposed LWE based PPSP
scheme is (m+1)∗log2(q). Similarly, log2(pub) and log2(k1)
number of bits are required for the Paillier based scheme and
Randomisation scheme, respectively.
At 128-bit level security, if we extract the parameters,
then n = 50, log2(q) = 570, log2(pub) = 3072, and
log2(k1) = 3072. Using these parameters, Table VII shows
the communication cost for all three schemes when the dimen-
sion of the input vectors is m = 30000. Its clear from Table
7 that the LWE scheme significantly benefits from a shorter
prime number (six times smaller than the other schemes prime
number) and achieves six times lower data requirement to
perform the scalar computation.
TABLE VII
COMMUNICATION COST COMPARISON.
X to Y Y to X Total
Proposed LWE PPSP 3.6 kB 2.1 MB ∼2 MB
Paillier PPSP 11.5 MB 0.3 kB ∼12 MB
Randomisation PPSP 11.5 MB 0.3 kB ∼12 MB
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper a novel privacy-preserving scalar product com-
putations using the fundamentals of lattice-based cryptography
has been proposed. In particular, the proposed scheme was
built directly on top of the lattice hard problems such as
shortest integer solution and learning with errors. 128−bit
encryption security has been achieved with the proposed
framework. Several validation and verification experiments
have shown that the proposed scheme is one of the best
performing scheme in terms of complexity whilst not com-
promising systems security.
Challenges and Future Work
The dimensions of the input vectors depend on n and q
i.e., m = n.log2(q). Hence the proposed work supports larger
dimensions such as 30000. Even though, this is appropriate for
many applications, converting the solution to support smaller
dimensions such as 100 would be an interesting problem that
requires further investigations.
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